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The article argues that Blake and Brock do not disagree on any important 
issues of principle, thus bringing their positions closer together than is 
suggested in the “debate” language that frames their book. The article also 
recommends that the discussion of the brain drain be expanded beyond 
the question of whether or not governments may restrict emigration to 
include questions about the moral responsibilities of rich states to prevent 
harmful brain drain and the moral responsibilities of skilled individuals to 
serve the communities in which they have been raised.
Keywords: brain drain, emigration, immigration, moral duties, skilled 
medical personnel
INTRODUCTION
The subtitle of Debating Brain Drain is the question “May Governments 
Restrict Emigration?” As this suggests, the central focus of the book is on 
the question of whether or not it is morally permissible for the governments 
of poor states to take legal measures to reduce the movement of their 
talented and skilled citizens to other countries, especially rich ones. Gillian 
Brock and Michael Blake are distinguished philosophers, and they provide 
a nuanced, thoughtful, and illuminating discussion of this question. While 
they differ in the emphasis they place on certain considerations, I do not 
think there is any real disagreement between the authors on the 
fundamental question posed in the subtitle, and I do not disagree with 
their shared conclusion. I should perhaps acknowledge, however, that in 
claiming that Brock and Blake are in basic agreement, I am disagreeing to 
some extent with Brock and Blake.
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1. THE BROCK/BLAKE CONSENSUS
Brock and Blake agree that there are empirical disputes about the effects of 
the emigration of talented and skilled people from poor states on the 
people left behind in those states and on the ability of those states to build 
better economic and political institutions. Brock’s reading of the literature 
leaves her more pessimistic about the consequences of such emigration 
and Blake’s reading leaves him more optimistic. Both acknowledge, 
however, that they are not specialists with an independent basis for judging 
the overall effects of emigration. Neither am I, and so I will try to construct 
a response that does not depend on a particular view of the empirical 
literature. Obviously, it makes no sense for poor states to seek ways to 
reduce emigration that is beneficial to them. So, it is appropriate to focus, 
as the authors do, on cases where emigration is actually harmful to those 
left behind in poor states. Both authors treat the emigration of skilled 
medical personnel as the prime example of such a case. 
Blake argues that, from a liberal perspective, individuals have a 
fundamental moral right to emigrate and a fundamental moral right to 
renounce their citizenship in their country of origin if they have another 
citizenship (Blake and Brock 2015: 114) He points out that these moral 
rights are reflected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and he 
insists that states normally may not use coercive measures to prevent 
individuals from exercising these rights, even when doing so would be 
good for other citizens. I agree with Blake about these claims.1  So far as I 
can tell, so does Brock. It may be fair to say that Brock does not emphasize 
the moral importance of the right to leave in the way that Blake does, but 
she does accept that right as a constraint upon morally legitimate policies. 
Nothing in Brock’s account suggests that she thinks it is morally acceptable 
for a state to adopt policies that violate the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, including its provisions regarding the right of exit and the right to 
change nationalities. 
The key point for Brock is that these rights are not absolute. That is 
something that Blake also acknowledges, however. While Blake insists that 
the right to exit and the right to renunciation are so fundamental that they 
may not be restricted for the sake of distributive justice or the promotion of 
the good of others, he explicitly says that “violation of a free and informed 
1  I would enter a note of caution, however, about Blake’s claim that the right to 
change nationality (which is what the UDHR protects) entails a right to renounce “any 
particularistic claim of justice” towards the inhabitants of the state one has left (Brock and 
Blake 2015: 114). Blake seems to be assuming here that all particularistic claims of justice 
must be legally enforceable. As I will argue below, this presupposes far too narrow a 
conception of justice.
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contract” can be grounds for limiting these fundamental liberties (Brock 
and Blake 2015: 115). A hundred pages later, he says that this makes it 
morally permissible for states to use contracts to limit emigration 
temporarily (Brock and Blake 2015: 215). While he insists that this is only a 
“very qualified yes” to the use of this technique, so far as I can see the 
qualifications he wants to impose are all ones that Brock herself accepts as 
limits on the policies that states may legitimately use to reduce unwanted 
emigration. This becomes particularly clear in her discussion on p. 275 of 
the ways in which their views converge around educational contracts, 
taxation of emigrant citizens, organization of medical training, etc. I can 
find no actual policy proposal that Brock endorses that Blake rejects.2 
The fact that Brock and Blake do not disagree about permissible policies 
does not prove that there are no significant philosophical differences 
between them. People can sometimes agree on policy proposals while 
disagreeing about principles. For example, conservatives may favor 
reducing criminal sentences because they think keeping people in prison 
is too costly, even though they regard long sentences as morally acceptable 
in principle. Liberals may favor reducing criminal sentences because they 
think that long sentences are unfair in principle. In that sort of case, the 
parties agree on a policy but not on moral principles. But I don’t think that 
is what is going on in the Brock/Blake exchange. While Blake talks more 
about freedom and Brock more about reducing the harms of emigration, 
each accepts the other’s principles. Brock does accept the principle that 
states may not violate the freedoms that Blake is emphasizing. That is why 
she focuses on contractual arrangements and on the background 
conditions within which agreements take place. Indeed, I think it becomes 
clear in Brock’s response to Blake that the whole purpose of her long 
discussion of the limited character of the demands being made upon 
potential emigrants was not to say, as Blake seems to think, that intrusions 
on fundamental rights are acceptable so long as they are only modest 
intrusions, but rather to show that the contractual conditions required of 
those seeking medical training are not so unconscionable as to void the 
claim that it is legitimate to enforce the contract (see Brock and Blake 2015: 
2  Blake says that “many of the ‘compulsory service’ proposals Brock defends … are 
unavailable for use by a liberal state” (Brock and Blake 2015: 112). The footnote specifies that 
he is actually rejecting only the first three of the seven proposals that Brock mentions (on 
49-50), and he offers no reason for thinking that these three proposals would be unacceptable 
if constructed as contracts rather than as imposed policies. I would add that Brock herself 
notes that the label “compulsory service” given to these proposals was supplied by the 
authors of the article she is discussing and is not a label that she herself would necessarily 
accept. In any event, her actual policy proposals on p. 275, which use the same sorts of 
mechanisms as the ones discussed on pp. 49-50, all involve contractual agreements that 
meet Blake’s concerns. 
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256 and 271). And Blake does accept the ideas that the emigration of skilled 
medical personnel from poor states contributes to global injustice, that 
poor states have strong and legitimate reasons to try to reduce this 
emigration if they can do so in a way that respects human freedom, and 
that contractually agreed upon restrictions on emigration are morally 
permissible given appropriate background circumstances. He may be 
more skeptical than Brock about how effective such permissible policies 
will be but that is an empirical disagreement not a difference of principle. 
In sum, the contrasts between them on the key question that the book 
addresses are more rhetorical than real, reflecting differences in emphasis 
rather than actual disagreements. 
2. EXPANDING THE MORAL TERRAIN OF THE DEBATE
One thing that puzzles me about the overarching framework of the book is 
that its focus is overwhelmingly on the question of what legal restrictions 
poor states may place on the emigration of their talented and skilled 
citizens. This is an important question but not the only one we should ask. 
Indeed, the authors themselves wander off at various points to explore 
other parts of the moral terrain in which the brain drain problem is 
situated, only to have such explorations short-circuited, as it were, by a 
renewed focus on this question of what legal restrictions poor states may 
legitimately enact. In the rest of my comments, I want to bring more clearly 
into view some of the other moral issues related to the brain drain. 
3. THE DUTIES OF RICH STATES
Brock and Blake seem to agree that the brain drain problem emerges 
primarily as a byproduct of global inequalities that are themselves deeply 
unjust. They also both agree that rich states benefit from these unjust 
global inequalities. So, it seems natural to ask what (if anything) rich states 
ought to do to address this problem. Even if we wanted to keep the focus 
entirely on what to do about the brain drain problem, rather than on the 
broader question of what to do about the global inequality that gives rise to 
the brain drain problem, why should we limit our normative evaluation to 
the behavior of poor states? Are there morally permissible, or perhaps 
morally obligatory, steps that rich states can and should take with respect 
to the brain drain? After all, the brain drain exists as a problem only 
because rich states are willing to admit the talented and skilled from poor 
states. So, one solution might be for rich states to stop such admissions. 
What should we think of that approach to the issue?
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Brock has written extensively about global justice, of course, and she 
summarizes some of her key claims in chapter 2 of this book. Surprisingly, 
however, she does not say much about what she thinks rich states ought to 
do (if anything) with respect to the brain drain problem. In particular, she 
does not address the possibility of changing the immigration polices of 
rich states (apart from endorsing Blake’s support of “ethical recruitment” 
while expressing skepticism about the effectiveness of that approach). By 
contrast, Blake does spend five pages on the topic (Brock and Blake 2015: 
219-224). So, let me start with that. Blake’s discussion is brief, but it provides 
a basis for beginning to identify some of the issues we need to consider in 
thinking about rich states and the brain drain. 
Blake begins by raising the possibility of a rich state excluding 
immigrants whose entry will contribute to the brain drain. He rejects that 
idea for three reasons. 
Blake’s first argument is “that the right to exclude is limited at best” 
(Brock and Blake 2015: 219). Having argued for open borders and for 
freedom of movement as a human right, I am myself quite sympathetic to 
this formulation, but it seems to me to be a curious claim for an author who 
is at pains elsewhere to defend the right of states to control immigration. In 
elaborating the point, Blake says that “those suffering under a non-
representative regime” have “rights to be admitted into a functioning 
liberal democratic state” (Brock and Blake 2015: 219). This sounds like an 
expansive definition of who ought to qualify as a refugee. Again, I’m 
sympathetic but I would note that a great many people would probably 
qualify as refugees under this formulation, and Blake has provided no 
basis for restricting the number admitted. So, treating the right to exclude 
as limited in this way seems to open the door to mass migration from poor 
states to rich ones, not a brain drain but a population drain. That raises a 
number of interesting questions that go well beyond the issue of the brain 
drain, but I don’t have space to explore them here.3 The main point is that 
this limitation on the right to exclude is not one that has any special bearing 
on the highly skilled. If the requirements to qualify for entry on the grounds 
that one is “suffering under a non-representative regime” are interpreted 
more narrowly, the right to exclude will seem more robust. That is the 
conventional view, and normally it is Blake’s view as well. From that 
perspective, most people from poor states don’t have a moral claim to entry 
into rich states, whether they are talented and skilled or not, and rich states 
thus do no wrong in excluding them.  
3  For an attempt to do so, see Carens (2013: chs. 10-12).
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Blake’s second argument is that “exclusion might produce 
underemployment and undocumented migration rather than foreign skills 
acquisition” (Brock and Blake 2015: 220). Blake gives no reason for 
supposing that this is a likely development, and it seems to me empirically 
implausible. The more important point, however, is that this suggestion is 
a distraction from the questions about principles that are the primary 
focus of the book. No one favors counter-productive policies. It is a premise 
of the whole brain drain discussion in the book that no state should adopt 
policies to reduce emigration from poor states if those policies are 
ultimately harmful to those left behind in the poor states. The philosophical 
debate is about whether it is morally justifiable, or perhaps even morally 
obligatory, to find ways to reduce emigration from poor states when that is 
beneficial to the poor states and their populations. It seems plausible to 
suppose that there are at least some circumstances under which reduced 
emigration would be beneficial. So, the key question is whether, under 
those circumstances, restrictions on immigration by rich states would be 
morally permissible, or perhaps even morally obligatory, if the restrictions 
helped to contribute to a reduction in emigration that would be beneficial 
to poor states. 
Blake’s third argument is that for a rich state to restrict entry of the 
talented and skilled from poor states would be “objectionably paternalistic” 
(Brock and Blake 2015: 220). Blake notes that he has argued that a poor 
state may not restrict the liberty of its own citizens for the sake of social 
justice and contends that it would be “equally disturbing” for a rich state to 
do this to the “foreign poor” (Brock and Blake 2015: 220). But this argument 
ignores the difference between a right of exit from one’s own state and a 
right of entry to another state. On Blake’s own view and in international 
human rights documents, this difference is fundamental. The former, the 
right of exit, is a basic human right. The latter, the right to enter a state 
where one is not a citizen, is not conventionally seen as a basic human 
right.4 So, denying entry is normally not as “disturbing” as denying exit. Of 
course, some reasons for denying entry (e.g., racial discrimination) may be 
morally objectionable, but on the conventional view states can justifiably 
refuse entry for many reasons that would not constitute a justification for 
refusing exit. The conventional freedom and human rights objections to 
restrictions on exit that constrain the way poor states may deal with their 
own citizens thus do not apply to restrictions on entry imposed by rich 
states. 
4  For a defense of the view that freedom of movement should be seen as a basic 
human right, see Carens (2013: ch. 11). Blake himself explicitly rejects this view, however.
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It seems to me therefore that Blake has not offered any compelling 
moral reason why rich states should not restrict the entry of talented and 
skilled immigrants from poor states, when doing so would reduce the sort 
of brain drain that he himself sees as morally undesirable. Indeed, the 
logic of Blake’s own argument seems to lead to just such restrictions. A bit 
later on in this section, Blake says that the most important thing that rich 
states can do to address the brain drain problem is to invest the resources 
needed to train their own doctors and nurses domestically (Brock and 
Blake 2015: 223). (I agree with this recommendation, by the way.) Blake 
does not fully spell out why this approach would help to address the brain 
drain, but the implicit rationale seems to be this. If rich states had nothing 
to gain by admitting doctors and nurses (because they had an adequate 
internal supply), they would no longer give foreign doctors and nurses 
priority in admissions and indeed might not admit them at all, since the 
opportunities for foreign medical personnel to use their talents and skills 
productively in the receiving state would be limited. If skilled medical 
personnel cannot get into rich states, they will stay home and the harmful 
brain drain will be reduced. Notice that there are two implicit 
presuppositions that underlie Blake’s view, the first empirical and the 
second normative. First, rich states will construct their admissions policy 
with a view to their own interests. They admit skilled medical personnel 
now only because they see it as advantageous to do so. If they no longer 
have anything to gain by admitting skilled medical personnel, they will 
cease to admit them or at least cease to give them priority in admissions. 
Second, this sort of restrictive immigration policy is morally permissible 
because (on the conventional view) immigrants with particular talents 
and skills have no special moral claim to priority in admission or indeed to 
admission at all. States are free to select immigrants on whatever basis 
they want, so long as they do not engage in impermissible forms of 
discrimination such as selection on the basis of race or religion and so long 
as they respect certain kinds of moral claims to admission such as those 
made by asylum seekers who qualify under the Geneva Convention and 
close family members who have a moral claim for family reunification.5 
So, while Blake ostensibly resists the idea that rich states should address 
the brain drain problem by restricting certain kinds of immigration, he 
actually recommends a course of action that is designed to lead to precisely 
that result. Indeed, we could go further. While Blake does not explicitly 
describe the domestic production of an adequate supply of medical 
personnel as a moral duty for rich states, it seems to me that his own 
analysis implies that it is, precisely because the failure to do this is directly 
5  For a fuller discussion of acceptable and unacceptable criteria of selection and 
exclusion under the conventional view, see Carens (2013: chs. 9-10).
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connected to the reasons why rich states recruit skilled medical personnel 
from poor states. 
Notice that what I am talking about is quite different from the “ethical 
recruitment” policies that Blake and Brock endorse. Recruitment efforts 
already presuppose the existence of demand for the people with the skills 
and talents being recruited and the possibility of people with those skills 
and demands gaining admission. If doctors and nurses from a poor state 
stood no better chance of gaining admission to rich states than any other 
normal citizen of the same poor state, there would be no recruiters 
knocking at their doors. 
4. MORALITY AND INTEREST
Brock and Blake have focused their discussion on what poor states may 
legitimately do to reduce harmful brain drain, and I have explored what 
rich states might do. There is, however, an important difference between 
the position of rich states and poor states with respect to the relationship 
between morality and interest when it comes to the brain drain. Assume 
(as an unrealistic but analytically useful simplification) that governments 
want to act in the interests of those they govern. The governments of poor 
states have an interest in reducing emigration that harms those left behind. 
They have to be able to distinguish between harmful and beneficial 
emigration, of course, and to find policies that reduce the former but not 
the latter (at least on balance). As we see in this book, that is not always 
easy. But in this process, morality acts primarily as a constraint upon 
policy choices, not as the main motivation for a policy choice. To be morally 
acceptable, the policy must respect the moral claims of the state’s own 
citizens, especially their basic human rights which include the right of exit. 
But the main motivation and justification for a (morally permissible) policy 
that reduces emigration can be simply that it serves the interests of the 
population that is being governed. 
Contrast this with the situation of the governments of rich states. If rich 
states stop giving preference in admission to skilled medical personnel 
from poor states (and assume here, for the sake of this argument, that this 
would in fact reduce harmful emigration from poor states), they will have 
to spend more money on training and educating medical personnel 
domestically or leave their populations underserved. Either way, they will 
be adopting a policy that is contrary to the interests of the population that 
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they govern, at least as interests are conventionally understood.6 Here 
morality becomes not simply a constraint on acceptable public policy, but 
its main motivation and justification. Duty, not interest, would be the 
driving force behind the proposed policy change. The government would 
have to say we are adopting this course because it is morally wrong to 
continue to take advantage of the medical training provided by poor states 
to serve our needs in the rich states. That might work politically in some 
contexts, but it might not in others. As a general matter, it is easier to get 
governments (and ordinary people) to act in accordance with moral duty 
when their duty coincides with their interests, at least their long-run 
interests, than when it conflicts with their interests (as is sometimes the 
case).
5. MORAL TRAGEDY AND THE BRAIN DRAIN
One issue on which Brock and Blake do disagree is on whether it is 
appropriate to see the brain drain as a moral tragedy. Towards the end of 
his initial statement, Blake suggests that we think of the brain drain as a 
moral tragedy, i.e., a situation in which “we face significant injustice, and 
yet we cannot move away from that injustice without deploying means 
that are themselves unjust” (Brock and Blake 2015: 226). Brock expresses 
skepticism that this is an appropriate way to characterize the brain drain 
problem, given the range of policies that she and Blake agree it would be 
morally permissible to employ to reduce the effects of the brain drain 
(Brock and Blake 2015: 267-273). I agree with Brock, but I would like to 
sharpen the critique even further.
Blake sets his worries about whether we know how to address the 
morally undesirable forms of brain drain in ways that are morally 
acceptable in the context of a wider concern about whether we know how 
to reduce global inequalities (which he regards as unjust) in ways that are 
morally acceptable. In effect, this attributes the enduring character of 
global injustice to a failure of knowledge, rather than a failure of will, on 
the part of rich states and their populations. I think that is a mistake. I do 
not mean to deny that there are lots of puzzles about the best way to 
eliminate poverty or promote economic development or reduce global 
inequalities and that some policies adopted with the best of intentions 
have proven to be counterproductive. But I also think that there are many, 
many examples of rich states simply pursuing their own interests at the 
6  As Plato shows in the Republic, it is possible to argue that we always have an 
overriding interest in being just regardless of how that affects our interests conventionally 
understood. I set aside here the possibility of reinterpreting our interests in this way.
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expense of poor states (e.g., in trade negotiations). In such cases, it is not 
knowledge of what would benefit poor states that is lacking but the 
willingness to put their interests ahead of the interests of rich states. Or 
take the current refugee crisis. In my view, what justice requires is plain 
enough: the admission and settlement of large numbers of refugees in 
Europe and North America. The problem is not that we don’t know how to 
do this, but rather that most rich states and their populations are unwilling 
to do what is morally required. So, they offload the responsibility for 
refugees onto the states nearest the ones from which the refugees are 
fleeing. There is no moral justification for this course of action. It is a failure 
of will, not knowledge. In sum, it is essential not to characterize these sorts 
of moral failures as moral tragedies brought on by our ignorance about 
what to do to reduce global injustice. 
With respect to the brain drain, the situation is perhaps a little more 
complicated. Nevertheless, Blake’s own analysis shows that one important 
way to reduce the demand for skilled medical personnel from poor states is 
for rich states to produce an adequate supply from within their own 
populations. And, as I have just argued, if they did that, the rich states 
would no longer have any incentive to give priority in admission to skilled 
medical personnel from poor states and they would violate no moral rights 
(as conventionally understood) in not giving admission priority to skilled 
medical personnel. I don’t say this would solve all of the issues raised in the 
brain drain debate, but it seems like one relatively clear and positive step 
that the rich states could take. Again, the main problem, it seems to me, is 
not a lack of knowledge but an unwillingness on the part of rich states and 
their populations to do what is morally required when that conflicts with 
their interests.  
6. DUTIES AND COMMUNITIES
Finally, the brain drain raises a number of interesting and important 
questions about the nature and extent of our moral obligations to particular 
communities or persons. Leave aside for a moment questions about legal 
restrictions. Do skilled medical personnel in poor states have a moral duty 
to stay at home and put their abilities to use in serving their fellow citizens? 
Do they act unjustly if they move to a rich state, even if they are legally free 
to do so?
Brock and Blake touch upon these questions, but again I think their 
exploration of them is short-circuited by their focus on legal constraints 
and the possibility of contractual agreements that can make legal 
constraints justifiable. Brock spends a bit of time at the beginning of 
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chapter four identifying normative arguments about the duties of citizens 
to contribute, but she frames this as a part of a report to a government 
seeking to implement a legally binding policy, and, as I indicated before, 
her focus is on showing that the conditions to which people are asked to 
consent are not unreasonable. So, we don’t really get the fuller sort of 
inquiry that would be required to explore questions about the nature and 
extent of our moral duties to contribute to the political communities in 
which we live and whether we have any obligations beyond what can be 
extracted from a formal contractual arrangement. This is an important 
question for the brain drain because if skilled medical personnel in poor 
states only stay at home as long as it takes to fulfill the requirements of a 
reasonable contractual agreement, the existence of such policies will not 
do much to remedy the problem. 
It may matter a lot whether people with medical training feel they have 
a duty to stay and help out or whether they feel morally entitled simply to 
pursue their own interests and inclinations wherever those lead. And our 
ideas about our duties and our entitlements do not simply fall from the sky. 
They are taught to us, formally and informally, by our families, our schools, 
and our society. There is no social order without social norms. But, of 
course, some social norms infringe unduly on personal freedoms, and 
some ways of inculcating social norms are morally problematic. Leave 
aside for the moment questions about the ways in which the normative 
ideas are passed on. What sorts of norms and values is it morally permissible 
for a political community to seek to transmit with respect to the concerns 
raised by the brain drain? For example, would it be morally acceptable for 
a poor state to teach children that those with special gifts and opportunities 
for advanced training have a particular obligation to use their gifts and 
training in ways that will benefit the community? Would it be morally 
acceptable to tell students that they should not seek medical training 
unless they are willing to commit themselves to working within their home 
state over the long run, at least under normal circumstances, (even if there 
were no effort to enforce this commitment legally)? Would it be morally 
acceptable to make that norm part of their professional training? Medical 
ethics routinely comprises part of the training of doctors. Would it be 
reasonable to see this sort of norm as one component of medical ethics for 
doctors in poor states? Would it be morally acceptable if this sort of 
expectation became part of a wider social culture, so that most people in a 
poor state felt it would normally be wrong for skilled medical personnel to 
move to a rich country?
I think that Brock might be inclined to respond positively to some of 
these questions, but her focus on what legal requirements states can 
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impose prevents her from exploring them adequately. This is not a criticism. 
To explore one topic thoroughly, one often has to bracket others. My goal 
here is simply to draw attention to some of the interesting questions that 
have been left unaddressed.
It might seem as though Blake provides more resources than Brock for 
answering at least some of these questions, and in Blake’s case the answer 
would appear to be in the negative, because he does spend a fair amount of 
time in chapters 7 and 8 criticizing arguments that seem to advance these 
sorts of claims about our moral duties. At almost every critical juncture in 
his discussion, however, Blake falls back upon an insistence that whatever 
sorts of moral duties we might have towards our communities or towards 
other people, they don’t justify using the coercive power of the state to 
compel people to take on certain jobs or perform certain tasks or to forfeit 
their legal right to exit. So, in the end, he doesn’t really tell us whether or 
not it is morally acceptable to have social expectations about what people 
do with their talents and skills or whether it is appropriate to see such 
expectations as legitimate moral duties. Nor does he show that it can never 
be morally wrong, even unjust, to leave a society, even when one has the 
legal right to do so.
Consider, for example, Blake’s discussion of the novel Stoner in which the 
main character chooses to become an English professor rather than to 
acquire agricultural knowledge and return home to help with the family 
farm as his parents expected him to do when they paid for his college edu-
cation. Blake says that we can disagree about the morality of Stoner’s 
choice but he should not be forced to study agriculture and to return to the 
farm. I certainly agree, but I would be interested to know whether Blake 
thinks that Stoner’s choice is morally justifiable or not and why. The fact 
that Stoner should not be forced to act in a particular way does not help us 
in answering that question. Would it be reasonable to say that Stoner has 
failed in a moral duty in acting as he did, and even perhaps that he acted 
unjustly? (Of course, we would need more information than Blake provides 
to assess that question since it would presumably depend in part on whether 
he simply abandoned his parents or took positive steps to repay the money 
they had invested in his education or to provide for them in some other way.) 
Blake sometimes writes as though any moral demand on a person to act in 
a certain way or to choose a certain path is an unreasonable infringement on 
free choice, but he doesn’t really develop that line of argument systemati-
cally, and I think it would be hard to sustain. At one point he distinguishes 
between “a duty of virtue” and “an enforceable duty of politics”, but I see no 
reason to assume that every political duty must be legally enforceable (Brock 
and Blake 2015: 121). Similarly, on the same page, he seems to want to limit 
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the terms “justice” and “rights” to matters that are legally enforceable, but 
he provides no reason for this restriction and I don’t think it corresponds to 
the way we use these terms in ordinary moral life. 
Later in the book, in criticizing the idea that it might be appropriate to 
say that people with greater abilities have stronger obligations because of 
those abilities, he criticizes the conventional gendered division of labor 
within the family, saying “we should recognize that we ought to allocate 
the burden of parenting fairly” (Brock and Blake 2015: 172). In this context 
he has no difficulty in recognizing that the language of fairness (justice?) 
can be invoked even when there is no question of legal enforcement of the 
requirements of fairness. The “we ought to allocate” is precisely a 
recognition of the existence of social norms (in this case, norms relating to 
gender) which are constructed collectively and which are an appropriate 
topic for political and moral disputation. So, in the same way, I don’t think 
that Blake could rule out of bounds, as he sometimes seems to try to do, the 
sorts of moral demands that some people would like to address to skilled 
medical personnel in poor states. But as with Brock, I think the main 
reason that Blake does not provide answers to the questions I have asked is 
simply because he has chosen to focus primarily on the issue of legitimate 
legal restrictions on exit, and that is a reasonable strategic choice.
So, how should we answer the sorts of questions I have posed? I must 
confess that I do not have a clear answer. On the one hand, like Brock and, 
I think, more than Blake, I am sympathetic to the idea that a just society 
can include legitimate expectations and social norms with respect to the 
ways in which people make use of their talents and skills. Choice is morally 
important, but it is not the only morally important consideration. In that 
respect, I’m sympathetic to the idea that it is reasonable to expect skilled 
medical personnel in a poor state to use their abilities to meet the health 
needs of their fellow citizens rather than using them simply for material 
gain or professional advancement in another society. On the other hand, 
we don’t live in a just world. So, I would also be sympathetic to a doctor or 
nurse from a poor state who said, “Why should I be the one to bear the 
burdens of serving the health needs of this community especially since 
they are in important respects the byproducts of an unjust social order? 
Why shouldn’t skilled medical personnel from rich states be the ones with 
a duty to come and address these problems?” From this perspective, those 
who go to work for Medecins sans Frontieres are simply fulfilling a moral 
duty, not acting altruistically as we are often inclined to think. And the 
doctors who stay in their home rich states are the ones failing in their moral 
duties, not the doctors who leave the poor states.
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To be frank, that is just the starting point for some of the intellectual 
puzzles that emerge when we seek to talk about moral duties in an unjust 
world. Often we invoke the language of rights and duties in a context that 
simply screens this background injustice from view. That is understandable 
and perhaps even necessary to guide action in the world, but from an 
intellectual and moral perspective it is also unsatisfactory. I think that 
these deeper puzzles about moral rights and duties in an unjust world that 
emerge from thinking about the brain drain in a wider perspective deserve 
the same sort of extensive and thoughtful treatment that Brock and Blake 
have given to the question of whether states may legally restrict emigration.
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